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Unilateral activities by a single country to mitigate global
warming are generally considered to be less effective due to the
effects referred to as "carbon leakage". Measures to mitigate global
warming need international coordination. However, with differing
economic and political conditions between countries, as well as
differing distribution of costs / benefits of anti-global warming policies,
achieving international coordination is a daunting task. The situation
calls for ingenuity, for proposals that lead countries to adopting anti-
global warming policies. In this paper, one such attempt is
considered by application of the median voter theory. In this
investigation, it becomes clear that international coordination can be
achieved with ingenuities on flexible policy-making, compensation
mechanisms, and carbon absorption. It also makes clear that under
global economies, one country can lead another to adopting
environmental policies, that is, a single country can make a difference
in the fight against global warming.
Key words : global warming, international coordination, democracy,
median voter
1. Introduction
The mitigation of global warming is of great consequence to our
society. The Kyoto Protocol calls for many developed countries to
reduce GHG emissions, but the US has not ratified it ", and neither
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are the developing countries committed to limit their emissions. One
result of this imperfect participation is the so-called carbon leakage
issue, which, on a global basis, will cancel out the amount of
reduction by Appendix I countries, or worse yet, cause non-Appendix
I countries 2) to increase emissions.
A large number of countries committed to international
coordination is essential for the battle against global warming to
succeed. Many countries already agree on the need to mitigate
global warming, but due to differing interests, are at odds over the
concrete methods for determining emission quotas, mitigation
measures, the timing of the measures, etc.3) The costs/benefits of
mitigation policies are widely different among countries. This only
underscores the need for greater efforts to organize international
coordination.
The battle against global warming is related to the problem of
the free rider on public goods supply and "the tragedy of the
commons"4'. If a large number of countries are not committed to
international coordination, then environmental resources will face
depletion. The question of this tragedy of commonsis a profound
issue for economics, and for our society. Some degree of restriction
on our behavior is needed in order to resolve the problem posed by
the tragedy of commons. For example, bold policies restricting our
economic behavior may significantly moderate the effects of climate
change. However, these policies need to be adoptable by many
countries or its value is nil. In this sense, the battle against global
warming can be won only when many countries participate in a
united effort, that is, efforts by a limited number of countries can
have only limited effect.
For an effective policy against global warming, the participation
of many countries is essential. This paper explores the conditions
needed for participation in international coordination and the factors
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stimulating international coordination, from the perspective of a public
choice regime 5).
2. Model
Suppose two countries, A and B, are deliberating whether to
accept or not to accept an anti-global warming policy package
characterized by 2 parameters. Parameter P represents severity in
policies. P increases as mitigation efforts increase, leading to an
earlier stabilization of CO2 emissions. And parameter F represents
flexibility in policy tools. F increases with an increase in the
number of policy tools from which countries can choose.
Country A produces fossil fuels, and its fossil fuel industry
accounts for a large share of country A's economy. Country B
produces no fossil fuels, but has an active environmental business
industry 6) for reasons including energy security and energy savings.
Under policy package (P,F), environmental business is stimulated
and GHGs reduced, but the demand for fossil fuels will decline,
shrinking the world economic growth rate. The cost of the policy
package is two fold. One is the used resource under the policy, and
the other is the difference in world GDP with and without the
policy 7).
Income is separated into 2 parts based on source. One source is
the profits of special industries whose demands are directly influenced
by anti-global warming policies. The second source is other profits.
The voters of countries A and B receive income from both sources at
various ratios.
Severity P will decrease future climate change damages D, but
will also increase policy cost PC, which is the sum of the direct
costs of used resources and the difference in world GDP. As a
result of an anti-global warming policy, the profits of the fossil fuel
104
industry Rf in country A will diminish while profits for environmental
business Re in country B will grow.
It is supposed that utility functions are the same among voters.
And the following functions are also supposed,
Ut= Ut (Q), C,= C, (Y;+avRj), Yi=y,Y (PC,D,Sj)
PC= PC (P,F)f D =D (P), Rj =Rj (P,F,Sj) (2.1)








the utility of i-th voter
consumption of i-th voter
profit of j-th industry
income from other than special industry
income of i-th voter from other than special industry
income share of i-th voter (constant)
policy cost
damages caused by climate change
i-th voter's share of Rj
severity of policy (0 < P)
flexibility of possible policy tools
subsidies to the j-th industry
Utility Ut is an increasing function of consumption Cr
Consumption C; is an increasing function of income Yt and the profits
of special industries Rj. Income Y is decreased by policy cost PC,
climate change damages D, and subsidies 5,-. Therefore, the following
inequality expressions are supposed,8*




Policy cost PC is an increasing function of severity P, and a
decreasing function of flexibility F.9) Climate change damages D is a
decreasing function of severity P. Flexibility F has no effect on
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climate change damages D. Thus, the next relations are supposed,
BPCdPC dD dD
> o, 3 J7 -<o, -r^<o, 3 J7
= 0 (2.3)
d p d F
'
à" dP dF
An increase in severity P decreases profits in the fossil fuel
industry Rf while increasing profits for environmental business Re.
Both flexibility F and subsidy 5} increase profits for special industries
Rj. Thus, the next inequalities are satisfied,
dRf n dRe n dRJ A M. n
~dP <0> 1F>0' ^#>0' ^>0 <2'4>
3. Decision Making
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the median voter
theory is operating in the collective decision making process for both
countries A and B.10) Thus, national policy is determined by the
median voter, including anti-global warming policies. In addition, it
is also assumed that the voters are well informed and understand the
issue of climate change damages D. Each country independently
decides whether to accept or not to accept policy (P, F). Policy (P,
F) will be effective conditional to acceptance by all countries.
When subsidies Sj and profits of special industries Rj are
unchanged, then
U{ (Q (y,y(PC (P,F), D (P), 0) + ai}R} (0,0)))
> Ui (C, (y?(PC(0,0),D (0), 0) + auRj(0,0)))
Thus,
I-U(C(y,Y(PC(PF),D(P) 0)+a,R,(00))) for
-U, (C, (v,r(PC (0,0),D (0), 0) + asRj (0,0))) > 0
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is assumed to be satisfied. This assumption means that if the
conditions of special industries are unchanged, then policy (P,F)
garners positive effects for all voters.
However, country A might not accept policy (P,F) even when
inequality (3.1) is satisfied. For example, the median voter might be
receiving income from the fossil fuel industry. When the following
inequality (3.2) is satisfied, the median voter will reject policy (P,F),
resulting in country A not adopting the policy. The subscript m
indicates the median voter.
MA- Um(Cm (YmY(PC(P,F\ D (P), 0) + amfRf(P,0)))
-Um(Cm (ymY(PC (0,0), D (0), 0) + 0^(0,0))) < 0 (3"2)
The reasoning is that under policy (P,F), the demand for fossil
fuels will decrease with a concomitant decrease in the profits of the
industry. Thus, we naturally think,
Rf(P,0) < Rf (0,0) (3.3)
In the case where the loss in profits amfRf is greater to the
median voter than the gains from decreases in climate change
damages D, the inequality (3.2) is satisfied.
On the other hand, in country B, profits for environmental
business Re will increase.
Re (P>0) > Re (0,0) (3.4)
By inequality (2.2), we have ~5cL~c57?L>0. It, therefore, follows
that under (2.2), (3.1), (3.4), the following inequality (3.5) must be
satisfied.
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U, (C(. {YiY(PC (P,F), D (/>), 0) + (5ieRe (P,0)))
-U,(C,(y,F{PC(0,0),D (0), 0) + j3fe^ (0,0))) >0
(3.5)
The relation, of course, is also the same for the median voter,
and the next inequality will also be satisfied,
MB-Um(Ca (ymy(PC (P,F), D (P), 0) + pmeRe (P,O)))
-t/M (cM (ymy(pc(0,0),d (o), o) + jsmeRe (o,o))) > o
(3.6)
where |3me is the median voter's distributed share of profits from
environmental businesses in country B.
From (3.6), we can conclude that the median voter in country B
will support the adoption of policy (P,F), and for the policy to be
adopted by their government. It also follows under (3.2) and (3.6)
for country A not to accept the policy and for country B to accept
it. Under these conditions, policy (P,F) is rendered ineffective despite
promising to be a positive step forward for most people.
4. Ingenuities on International Coordination
As (3.1) assures us, the policy in general is positive.
Nevertheless, international coordination on anti-global warming policies
is hampered by special industries. In an attempt to pursue the
possibility of international coordination, under what conditions,
therefore, might the decision of the median voter in country A be
changed?
The participation of country A is dependent on satisfying
inequality (4.1) under (3.1).
Mas Um(Cm (YmY (PC (P,F), D (P), Sf) + amfRf(P,Sf)))
-Um(Cm (ymY(PC(0,0),D (0), 0) + 0^(0,0))) >0
(4.1)
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Inequality (4.1) may be satisfied by exogenous changes to a few
variables
A. Increase Flexibility
Increasing flexibility F will decrease anti-global warming policy
costs, making it more attractive for country A to cooperate with
country B, thus the policy is effective.
*MA dUn, dCm BY dPC
dF -y« dcm ~W~dPC ~dT>0 (4-2>
That is, increasing flexibility F increases policy feasibility. If
flexibility F can be made large enough for inequality (4.1) to be
satisfied, then country A will participate in the international
cooperation against global warming.
There are several aspects to consider regarding flexibility F.
From the aspect of flexibility in time, it may be more practical to
consider mitigation schedules in the long-term rather than short-term.
For example, immediate mitigation measures might disrupt the broad
international cooperation and dampen the effectiveness of anti-global
warming policies. From the aspect of flexibility as to areas or
regions, the Kyoto mechanism may be very useful. For example, due
to costs, mitigation measures appropriate for some regions may not be
appropriate for others. From the aspect of flexibility as to sectors, it
would be advisable to take careful note of the need to allocate quotas
per sector. For example, some sectors can reduce emissions more
easily than others. Also, the trading of emission quotas between
sectors can keep policy costs down and facilitate the development of
international coordination. Lastly, the aspect of flexibility as to
policy tools cannot be overemphasized. It should come as no
surprise that each country has its own suitable policy tool. However,
a policy tool that works for one country may prove to be more
difficult or more costly for another country. Therefore, having a
large portfolio of policy tool options may prove to be useful for
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keeping mitigation costs down and making anti-global warming
policies effective n).
B. Modify Severity
It is helpful to begin with a definition of optimal severity.
Optimality implies the maximization of some utility. In this analysis,
the social optimal severity Ps is defined as the severity that maximizes
utility when the profits of special industries remain unchanged. The
first order condition of this social optimal severity is,
dY dPC dY dD
a n 3P
= 0 (4.3)
dPC dP dD dP
  This optimal severity, however, is not always optimal for the
median voter whose income is partly derived from special industries.
The first order condition of optimal severity for the median voter (
P'
m)is,
dY dPC dY 3D1
dCm dRf'
+an 3p \+amf 7\T?'^p"~u y^A)dpc dp *do dpy"mfdRf dp
 (1) When [W1F+^^J<0
  This implies P is larger than Psn\ In this case, increases in
severity P leads to larger incremental increases in policy costs (PC)
as compared to the incremental decreases in climate change damages
D. Thus,
 f dY dPC dY dD)  dCmdRf _*«{~WC ^P~+^D -dF\+a-f^R-
f~dP<0 <4-5)
  This is because both terms on the left are negative. Severity P
is larger than the optimal severity for the median voter P*
m. Thus,
the next inequality is satisfied,
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M«L-Wm\v d£nlJl_ dPC dY dD } dCm dR,] n
dP "3Cffl[Ym BY[ dPC dP +dD ~W\+a»>fW; dP <0
,(4.6)
This means that decreasing severity P leads the median voter to
supporting an anti-global warming policy.
. 0, f dY dPC dYdD1 n A
(2) When {^pc ^p~+^D-~W\>0 and
r ay bpc dY dD) dcmdRf A
Ym[ dpe dp +dD ~w}+°v^7"ap<013)
This implies P is smaller than Ps. In this instance, inequality
(4.6) is satisfied. Therefore, decreasing severity P leads the median
voter to accepting an anti-global warming policy even when severity
P is smaller than the social optimal severity Ps.
(3) When ^-^r^F-+1^^Fj>O and
f dY dPC dY^ dD_] dCm dRf.
7m{dPC dP +dD dP\+a'"fdRf dP>0
In this instance, severity P is smaller than the optimal severity
for both society and the median voter. Therefore,
^>0 (4.7)
This shows policy (P,F) will give more utility to the median
voter than at initial levels. Thus, Mm>0. And without having to
make any additional modifications, we see that the median voter will
not reject policy (P,F).
C. Change in Profits of Special Industries
The median voter's decision can be altered by changes in the
profits of special industries. If an anti-global warming policy does
not trigger significant changes in the income derived from special
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industries, that is, if amf(Rf(P,Sf) -Rf(0,0)) is small enough, then the
median voter's gains from the policy will exceed the losses caused
by the decreasing profits in special industries. Then, Mm> 0 will be
satisfied.
(1) Compensation Mechanism -Subsidies
If policy (P,F) can subsidize the fossil fuel industry, then the
subsidies compensate the special industries for their lost profits. The
following equation expresses how these subsidies 5/ to the fossil fuel
industry alter the decision of the median voter:
dMA dUm dCM dY dUm dCm dRf
- "Tm 7*r" av" ;».?. ~yamf?\r~ 3K>. as. i4.5jd Sf YmdCm dY dSf T^mfdCm dRf dSf
The first term on the right represents per capita distortions due to
subsidies. The second term on the right represents the additional
increase in income to the median voter as a result of the subsidy. If
amf is positive and not small, the effect of the second term will be
superior to that of the first term based on the thought that a subsidy
to a specific industry is assumed to be distributed across a small
number of people. In such a case, the inequality ^A >0 is
satisfied. Thus in this instance, a subsidy to the fossil fuel industry
leads to the median voter supporting the policy (P,F).
From the above, we can infer that even when policy (P,F)
decreases demand in certain industries, a compensation mechanism can
attract country A to join the international cooperation in the battle
against global warming.
(2) Absorption of CO2 and Geo-engineering14)
Demand for fossil fuels will inevitably fall with the
implementation of anti-global warming measures. However, if GHGs
can be reduced, or the earth cooled, without diminishing the demand
for fossil fuels, then policy (P,F) would have no impact on the
profits of the fossil fuel industry, and country A would have no
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obstacle to accepting policy (P,F). As examples, we can consider
Geo-engineering and the absorption of carbon dioxide as policy tools
that do not decrease demand Iprofits in the fossil fuel industry.
With policy tools such as Geo-engineering or absorption of CO2,
there is no change in profits to the fossil fuel industry. Thus, it is
natural to suppose that,
-^f=0 and Rf (P,0) =Rf (0,0).
Then,
MA= Um(Cm (y,J(PC (P,F),D (P), 0) + amfRf(P,0)))
-Um(Cm (y,nY(PC(0,0), D (0), 0) + a,nfRf(0,0)))
=Um(Cm(ymY(PC(P,F),D (P),0)+ 0^(0,0))) { }
-Um(Cm(YmY(PC(0,0),D(0),0)+0^(0,0)))=/ >0
due to,
/,= Ut (C, (y,.F(PC (P,F), D (P\ 0) + a, 7?, (P,0)))
-U, (C, (y,y(PC(0,0), £> (0), 0) + ai}Rj (0,0))) > 0 for all i,j (3.1)
Thus we can see that by implementation of a policy with ~^J-
and Rf(P,0) = Rf(0,Q), country A will adopt policy (P,F).
D. Global Economies
In the foregoing model analysis, every voter receives income only
in his/her country. That is, the median voter in country A receives a
portion of the profits of the fossil fuel industry, buthas no
opportunity to share in the profits of the environmental business
industry of country B. Likewise, the median voter in country B has
no opportunity to share in the profits of the fossil fuel industry of
country A.
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In the real world, we live in so-called global economies, receive
income from other countries, and retain interests not only in our own
country, but in other countries as well. That is, utilities of the median
voter are affected by both the policies of the voter's country of
residence and by the policies of other countries. Living in a global
economy, the utility function of the median voter in country A is,
therefore, modified as follows,
Um= Um(Cm (ymY(PC (P,F\ D (P), Sf) + amfRf(P,Sf) + ameRe (P,S<)))
(4.10)
where ame is the portion of profits of environmental business
distributed to the median voter of country A. The sufficient
condition for country A to accept policy (P,F) is modified to the
following inequality,
Ma=Um(Cm (ymY{PC (P,F), D (P), Sf) + amfRf(P,Sf) + ameRe (P,Se)))
-Um(Cm (ymY(PC (0,0), D (0)) + amfRf(0,0) + ameRe(0,0))) > 0
(4.ll)
Similar to the model under conditions of a non-global economy,
in this instance, too, the decision making of country A is affected by
changes in flexibility F, severity P, compensation mechanisms, and
policy tools such as Geo-engineering and absorption of CO2. The
difference under conditions of global economies, however, is that
country B is in a position to affect the utility of the median voter in
country A and, consequently, the decisions of country A.
Suppose that country B grants subsidies, or increases subsidies, to
its environmental business industry. This policy in country B would
affect the utility of the median voter of country A, and the effect is
represented in the following inequality,
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dse -aá"dcm ~ds; >0 (4-12)
That is, increasing subsidies to environmental business in country
B leads country A to adopting policy (P,F). This is an instance of
how one country's implementation of an anti-global warming policy
can facilitate the adoption of an anti-global warming policy in another
country.
5. Implications & Conclusions
With each passing day, unfolding research in the natural sciences
draws attention to global warming as one of the most pressing issues
facing our world today. We need policies to counter the effects of
global warming. Recent environmental movements are encouraging
and help to put our society on track. At the same time, from an
economic standpoint, we also need to be cognizant of efficiency as a
crucial value for our society in general. The battle against global
warming is no exception to the rule that efficiency needs heeding as
an important value standard.
Contemporary arguments on global warming leave me with two
grave concerns. The first is inattention to efficiency. For example,
official reports such as IPCC (2007) and Stern (2007) targets year
2100L5) for the stabilization of CO2 concentrations, however, there
appears to be no rationale for this date, or it has not been presented
if they have onei6). Nordhaus (2007), on the other hand, argues
optimal mitigation policy, basically, on standard cost benefit analysis
methods. The target is about year 2200, to be in line with optimal
policy. Arguments in the IPCC will have significant impact on the
post-Kyoto international regime, but not with respect to efficiency.171
My second concern is inattention to feasibility. More countries
will avoid policies that have greater severity. But when global
participation is needed in the battle against global warming, analyses
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on feasibility is crucial. Without feasibility, any policy is simply
wishful thinking. This paper is an attempt, in the context of public
choice, to search for ingenuities that make policy effective and
feasible.
The first ingenuity is flexibility in policy. Flexibility not only
decreases policy cost, but it also increases feasibility. The second
ingenuity is keeping severity low, which also increases feasibility.
We may hear many voices calling for urgent implementation of
severe environmental policies, but this risks losing feasibility. The
third ingenuity is compensation mechanisms. Policies having
compensation mechanisms are more likely to be adopted, leading to
broad participation. Distortions in the economy may result, and it is
important to compare the costs / benefits of compensations. The cost
is concomitant to distortion, and the benefit is making the policy
feasible.
The last and most important conclusion of this paper is that a
single country, by implementing certain anti-global warming policies
such as the promotion of its environmental business industry, can
change the direction of another country's decision making. The
popular thought is that one country's anti-global warming activities
are ineffective due to the effects of carbon leakage, but in global
economies, certain policies, even implemented unilaterally, can attract
other countries into participating in the battle against global warming.
We have not given attention to the fact that in democracies decision-
making structures are changeable, and can be affected by a policy in
another country as well as by the economic structure. The bottom
line is we vote for our own interests, if we are convinced of growth
potential in the environmental business industry, we will not hesitate
to invest in and vote for the interests of environmental business.
Investments in environmental projects such as "Clean
Development", "Joint Implementation" and emissions trades in the
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Kyoto Protocol should enhance the environmental business industry.
The Kyoto mechanism has spawned many environmental business
opportunities, and this business climate may pressure countries
including the US and Australia into activities that mitigate global
warming. The built-in mechanisms in a democracy can be used to
advantage to respond to the global warming problem.
Our global economies comprise democracies and non-democracies.
We need to better understand decision-making in the large non-
democracies, particularly China, if we are to succeed in maintaining a
sound world for the future.
Notes
Australia had not ratified Kyoto Protocol until December 2007, but after the
change of government the new Australian government ratified it.
For example, Hamasaki (2007) estimated that, under the Kyoto Protocol,
more than 50% of reduced emissions by Appendix I countries would be
canceled out by. increased emissions of countries having no obligations.
Nordhaus (2007) noted that the Kyoto Protocol did not clearly differentiate
CO2 emissions from the baseline scenario. Stern (2007) pointed out that if
countries were to initiate mitigation policies at different rates, problems at
industrial locations would arise (p.259-263). IPCC (2007) also referred to
carbon leakage. Weyant (1993) holds that absent the participation of China,
in the future, even with all other countries reducing CO2 emissions to zero,
China alone would keep CO2 emission levels at present worldwide levels.
In the negotiation process of the Kyoto Protocol, COP6 (Hague) failed to
reach agreement on the issues in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.
(http ://unfccc.int/cop7/issues/index.html)
Hardin (1968) was the first to describe this problem. Dietz, Ostrom, and
Stern (2003) sought solutions to global warming issues by treating it as a
sort of tragedy of commons. Stern (2007) noted that "Climate change
mitigation raises the classic problem of the provision of a global public
good"(p.450), and pointed out the importance of transparency, comparability
of countries and an understanding of climate change.
Mueller(1989) provides basic and comprehensive explanations on Public
Choice literature.
Although, in general, the concept of environmental business is ambiguous,
businesses in wind power generation, solar photovoltaic power generation,
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recycling and fuel cells are a few examples. In this model,
"environmental business" means those industries that will see an increase in
demand due to anti-global warming policies.
7) Cost measures of anti-global warming policies differ in different studies.
There is no consensus as to what is adequate as a cost measure. Weyant
(1993) presented comparative studies on cost measures for global warming.
More recent studies and reports such as IPCC (2007), Stern (2007), and
Nordhaus (2007) have set cost measure as the difference in GDP between
the baseline scenario and the with-policy scenarios.
8) Subsidies to industries can include those unrelated to anti-global warming
policies, thus the portion of subsidies attributed to the anti-global warming
policy is represented as Sj.
9) Stern (2007) shows that policy cost decreases with flexibility in sectors,
technologies, and gases identified as subjects of mitigation as well as the
location of mitigation activities, (p.244-246)
10) For the median voter theory, the issue should be presented on a one
dimension policy axis. If a national referendum is held only on the anti-
global warming policy, then the median voter can decide whether the
country agrees or does not agree with the policy. Congleton (2007) gives a
precise explanation of the median voter theory.
ll) Stern (2007) discusses flexibilities in detail, (p.244 - 246)
12) It is assumed that utility will increase with the increase of severity P when
P is smaller and utility will decrease with the decrease of severity P when
P is lar§er- dCm dRf
13) From the equation (2.2) and (2.4), amf"5^~ ~ap <0-
14) Broad (2006) describes Geo-engineering, "a controversial field known as
geoengineering, which means rearranging the earth's environment on a large
scale to suit human needs and promote habitability". For analyses and
comments on the risks, possibilities and costs of Geo-engineering, refer to
"Greenhouse Warming", National Academy of Sciences (1992), Committee
on Geological and Geotechnical Engineering in the New Millennium (2006)
and IPCC (2007).
15) IPCC(2007), Executive Summary (p.22 footnote 34), "Studies vary in terms
of the point in time stabilization is achieved; generally this is around 2100
or later."
16) Analyses by Nordhaus (1993, 1999 and, 2007) solved the maximizing
problem with respect to social welfare. On the other hand, the policy
recommended by Stern (2007) or IPCC (2001, 2007) appears to lack any
sense of optimality. As Stern (2007: Executive Summary p.l) has said,
"Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest
and widest-ranging market failure ever seen. The economic analysis must
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therefore be global, deal with long time horizons, have the economics of
risk and uncertainty at centre stage, and examine the possibility of major,
non-marginal change," the chance for any optimality cannot be rationally
reasoned by the existence of uncertainty.
17) "The 'ambitious' policies proposed in the Stern and Gore regimes have the
opposite problem. They are inefficient because they impose too large
emissions reductions in the short run." Nordhaus (2007), p.38
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